The rst example of a simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition in intuitionistic type theory is Martin-L of's universe a la Tarski. A set U0 of codes for small sets is generated inductively at the same time as a function T0, which maps a code to the corresponding small set, is de ned by recursion on the way the elements of U0 are generated.
Introduction
Martin-L of type theory is a foundational framework in which induction is the principal notion. It is, to quote Martin-L of 27, p73], \intended to be a full scale system for formalising intuitionistic mathematics as developed, for example, in the book by Bishop 10] ".
It is also a typed functional programming language not unlike ML 33] or Miranda 9] . A \set" in the theory is de ned inductively by listing its constructors with their types in much the same way as one de nes a recursive datatype in ML or Miranda. But whereas ML and Miranda are based on the simply typed -calculus, Martin-L of type theory also has dependent types. The other key di erence is that only well-founded elements of datatypes (sets) and terminating programs (total functions) may be constructed. To ensure well-foundedness datatype de nitions have to satisfy a kind of \strict positivity" criterion. Moreover, to ensure termination recursive function de nitions are restricted to \structural" recursion, that is, recursion on the way the elements of the domain of de nition are inductively generated.
For simple types we can use the following notion of strict positivity. Let intro : 1 ! ! n ! P (n 0) be a constructor for the datatype P. Then i either does not contain any occurrences of P or has the form 1 ! ! m ! P (m 0), where j does not have any occurrences of P. It is also clear what the appropriate notion of structural recursion is for such a recursive datatype. Note that we allow generalised inductive de nitions since a constructor can have functional arguments (m > 0). Therefore, the informal semantic notions of well-founded element and terminating function depend on each other. The introduction of dependent types dramatically increases the expressiveness of the language. In particular, we can interpret intuitionistic predicate logic by following Curry, Howard, and de Bruijn and identify propositions and sets. In addition to the ordinary non-dependent set formers 0; 1; +; ; and !, which can be used for interpreting the logical connectives ?, >, _,^, and , we now also have and , the disjoint union and Cartesian product of a family of sets, which can be used for interpreting the quanti ers 9 and 8.
However, the appropriate notion corresponding to \strict positivity" becomes more complex in the context of dependent types. Instead of formulating such a general condition for inductive de nitions of sets Martin-L of 31, 27, 28, 29] gave rules for a collection of speci c set formers. However, this collection may be extended when there is a need for it provided the informal semantic principles of the theory are respected.
The possibility of formulating a general schema was however mentioned in Martin-L of 1972 31]:
The type N is just the prime example of a type introduced by an ordinary inductive de nition.
However, it seems preferable to treat this special case rather than to give a necessarily much more complicated general formulation which would include ( 2 A)B(x), A + B, N n and N as special cases. See Martin-L of 1971 26] for a general formulation of inductive de nitions in the language of ordinary rst order predicate logic. The rst such general schema was formulated by Backhouse 7] and covered the case of inductively de ned sets (possibly depending on parameters). This schema was generalised to the case of inductively de ned families of sets by Dybjer 19, 20] . Inductively de ned families subsume inductively de ned predicates, and this schema can be viewed as the type-theoretic generalisation of the natural deduction schema for inductively de ned predicates in predicate logic given by Martin-L of 26] .
In this paper we introduce a further generalization of the schema in Dybjer 20] . It covers simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions including de nitions of a variety of universes which were not accounted for by the old schema. It also gives rise to other interesting notions including a constructive version of Aczel's Frege structures.
Universes in type theory are analogous to Grothendieck universes in set theory: they are sets of \small" sets and can be used for example for the formalisation of constructive category theory. Another interesting application of universes (here in conjunction with generalised inductive de nitions) is Aczel's universe of iterative sets, in which a constructive version of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory CZF can be interpreted 3] . But in the standard formulations of type theory universes are needed also for the more basic purpose of de ning families of sets by structural recursion. For example, the predicate Z (as used in the type-theoretic proof that 0 6 = s(n) 29, 43] ) with the recursion equations Z(0) = >; Z(s(n)) = ?
is de ned in terms of universes and the rule of N-elimination.
Martin-L of 27] introduced an in nite tower of universes U 0 : U 1 : U 2 : . These were formulated \ a la Russell" 29], which means that there is no syntactic distinction between a small set considered as an element of a universe A : U i and considered as a set A. In contrast, the formulation \ a la Tarski" 29] maintains such a distinction: a : U i is a code for the set T i (a). A universe a la Tarski should therefore be understood as a pair (U i ; T i ) consisting of a set U i of codes and a decoding function T i .
Further universes were introduced by Palmgren 35] . Firstly, he de ned a universe operator, that is, an operator on families of sets which when applied to a universe (U i ; T i ) returns the next universe (U i+1 ; T i+1 ). In this way the external sequence of universes a la Tarski (U 0 ; T 0 ); (U Setzer 41] , and Rathjen, Gri or, and Palmgren 39] .
We conclude this introduction with a few words about the notation. We employ the \logical framework" formulation of Martin-L of type theory 30, 34] . The core of this theory is a typed -calculus with dependent types. There is a base type set, the type of sets, and for each object A : set, there is the type El(A) (often written just A) of the elements of A. We write (x : ) for the type of functions which map an object a : to an object f(a) : a=x]. If does not depend on x : we may write ( ) (rather than ! ) instead of (x : ) . Abstraction is written (x)b and application f(a), rather than the usual notation x:b and f a from -calculus. We also write (x 1 ; : : : ; x n )b = (x 1 ) (x n )b for multiple abstraction, and f(a 1 ; : : : ; a n ) = f(a 1 ) (a n ) for multiple application. In this type system (set)(set)set is for example the type of binary logical connectives; (A : set)(B : (A)set)set is the type of quanti ers; and (N)set is the type of unary predicates on N and also the type of N-indexed families of sets.
The formulation of the schema for simultaneous induction-recursion in section 3 will use two auxiliary notions. Firstly, we will write (a :: ) as an abbreviation of (a 1 : 1 ) (a n : n ) and call a sequence of types. (This abbreviation could be avoided by adding -types to the -calculus with dependent types.) Secondly, we will say that a type is small if it contains no occurrences of set. (Small types are called s-types in 19].) Small types are almost like sets. But the logical framework formulation we use maintains a distinction between the set (A; B) and the small type (x : A)B(x). Since we want our schema to cover the rules for as well we need to refer to small types when formulating the requirements on the rules.
Plan of the paper. In section 2 we introduce simultaneous induction-recursion by two examples: the rst universe a la Tarski and the fresh-lists (lists where all elements are distinct). In section 3 we give the general schema for simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions in type theory. We also show how to recover the rst universe a la Tarski and the fresh-lists by instantiating the schema. In section 4 we discuss further universe constructions which are instances of the schema. In section 5 we show how the construction of Frege structures in type theory is yet another instance of the schema. In section 6 we build a classical Frege structure model of a restricted version of the schema using monotone inductive de nitions. In section 7 we conclude.
Two examples of simultaneous induction-recursion
The prototypical example of simultaneous induction-recursion is Martin-L of's de nition of the rst universe a la Tarski 29] . It consists of the simultaneous inductive de nition of the set U 0 of codes for small sets and the recursive de nition of the decoding function T 0 : (U 0 )set. U 0 has one introduction rule (and one equality rule) for each set former which is re ected in the universe. We here give two examples: -formation is re ected by the following rule of U 0 -introduction:
and we have the following equality rule: )) in terms of the already constructed proposition Fresh(u). There are of course a number of alternative ways to de ne Dlist and Fresh using ordinary inductive de nitions, but the inductive-recursive one seems natural and may be preferred for some purposes.
In both examples we simultaneously build a function and its domain of de nition. This intuition can be captured using a classical notion of monotone inductive de nition and thus yield a consistency proof. This is the idea behind the realisability model in section 5.
A set former in Martin-L of type theory is speci ed by its formation and introduction rules. Moreover, in the standard formulation 28, 29] it has an elimination rule which expresses a general principle of de nition of a function by structural recursion. A particular function de ned by structural recursion (for example the addition function on natural numbers) is then obtained by instantiating the elimination rule in question. Its recursion equations are then derived by instantiating the equality rules. But it is also possible to formulate de nition by structural recursion by an external schema (so that for example the addition function is obtained as an instance) as in Martin-L of 27], Coquand 14] , and Dybjer 19] .
When considering simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions it is essential to adopt the latter approach (using an external schema). The reason is that the elimination rule expresses only de nition by structural recursion on a previously (and not simultaneously) de ned set. For example, the de nition of T 0 is an instance of a recursive schema. It cannot be formulated in terms of U 0 -elimination, because already the formulation of U 0 -elimination refers to T 0 .
Moreover, we want the schema for simultaneous induction-recursion to specialise to universe constructions. It is therefore essential that we do not require that the value of a function de ned by recursion necessarily is an element of a set (as in the traditional elimination rules). Instead the value can be an object of an arbitrary type (as in the \large" elimination rules 44, 45] . For example, the value may be a set (an object of the type set), so we have recursively de ned families of sets.
Note that we have reversed the priority of the following concepts as compared to the standard formulations of Martin-L of type theory 28, 29, 34] :
Elimination and equality rules are special instances of the recursive schemata, whereas in the standard formulation the recursive schemata are derived from the elimination and equality rules. Universes are special kinds of simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions employing set-valued recursion, whereas in the standard formulation set-valued recursion is obtained from the elimination and equality rules in conjunction with universes.
Formalising the notion of a simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition
We use the schematic style of Martin-L of's intuitionistic theory of iterated inductive de nitions in predicate logic 26] for presenting the theory of simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions in type theory. As already mentioned the present schema is a generalisation of the schema in Dybjer 19, 20] . The main di erence is that the extended schema for an introduction rule may refer to a function de ned simultaneously by recursion. To highlight the similarity between the extended schema and the old schema we use the same notation here as in Dybjer 20] . The present description could form the basis for an implementation in the same way as the old schema 20] is the basis of Gim enez' 22] implementation of inductive de nitions in a proof editor for Martin-L of type theory, and as Coquand and Paulin's formulation of inductive types in the calculus of constructions 16, 38] is the basis for the Coq-system 18].
To illustrate the schema, we show how the rules for the rst universe and the fresh-lists can be derived by instantiation. Later sections contain further examples. It might be helpful to study these examples before studying the general formulation given in this section.
I present the case with one inductive and one recursive de nition. Clearly, the schema can be generalised to the case with several simultaneous inductive and several (possibly zero) recursive de nitions, but we will not spell out the details.
To begin with (in 3.1-3.4) we assume that there are no parameters. In 3.5 it is shown how to extend the schema to simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions with parameters.
A de nition is always relative to a theory containing the rules for previously de ned concepts. Thus the requirements on the di erent parts of the de nitions ( ; ; ; ; p; q below) are always judgements with respect to that theory.
Formation rules
Schema. Let be a sequence of small types. A simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition of an -indexed family of sets P and an -indexed family of functions f de ned by P-recursion has formation rules of the form P : (a :: )set; f : (a :: )(c : P(a)) a]:
Here we also require that a] is a type under the assumptions a :: .
Examples. The formation rules for the rst universe U 0 : set; T 0 : (c : U 0 )set are obtained by letting P be U 0 , f be T 0 , be the empty sequence, and c] be set.
The formation rules for fresh-lists Dlist : set;
Fresh : (c : Dlist)(a : A)set are obtained by letting P be Dlist, f be Fresh, be empty and c] be (a : A)set (the type of predicates on A).
For an example where is a non-empty sequence, see section 5 on Frege structures, where the properties of internal propositionality and internal truth are de ned.
Introduction rules
Schema. A premise of an introduction rule is either non-recursive or recursive. In the sequel we will write intro : (b : ) (u : (x :: )P (p x])) P(q) for the general form of an introduction rule. It indicates that a typical constructor intro may have non-recursive premises (arguments) b : and recursive premises u : (x :: )P (p x]). There may be zero or more premises of either kind and they may appear in arbitrary order.
If we remove the possibility that ; ; p, and q depend on previous recursive premises, then we essentially recover the schema in Dybjer 20] , because then f cannot appear in the introduction rules for P.
Moreover, since a non-recursive premise then cannot depend on a recursive one, we can without loss of generality assume that all non-recursive premises precede the recursive premises. 
A generalisation of universe elimination
Schema. Universe elimination (as described in Nordstr om, Petersson, and Smith 34]) expresses de nition by U 0 -recursion after U 0 and T 0 are de ned. Here we express the corresponding notion schematically.
We also show that ordinary universe elimination is a special case of this schema.
In general, after the simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition of P and f has been completed, we 
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Universe hierarchies and super-universes
In this section we review the universe hierarchies and super-universes of Palmgren 35] . Palmgren presented these constructions in a one-o fashion with informal motivations for the rules. Here we use our notion of a simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition to give a uni ed formal treatment of all these constructions: as for the rules for U 0 we can recover them by instantiating the appropriate part of the general schema above.
External universe hierarchies
The second universe has formation rules U 1 : set; T 1 : (U 1 )set; and analogous rules for the constructors 1 and eq 1 to those for 0 and eq 0 . There is also an introduction and equality rule re ecting U 0 -formation: u 01 : U 1 ; T 1 (u 01 ) = U 0 : We also wish to re ect T 0 as a function into the second universe:
t 01 : (U 0 )U 1 ;
and therefore we let t 01 be a constructor for U 1 . (Palmgren also mentions the possibility of de ning t 01 by recursion on U 0 .) The equality rule for T 1 is:
We can continue in an analogous way and de ne U 2 and T 2 , U 3 and T 3 , etc. and thus get an external universe hierarchy.
An internal universe hierarchy and a super-universe
The construction of U n+1 and T n+1 from U n and T n can be internalised. We give a simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition of the set formers Nextu : (U : set)(T : (U)set)set;
Nextt : (U : set)(T : (U)set)(Nextu(U; T))set; and let U n+1 = Nextu(U n ; T n ) and T n+1 = Nextt(U n ; T n ).
U and T are parameters of this de nition. For simplicity, we suppress these parameters in the rules for Nextu and Nextt and write Nextu : set; Nextt : (Nextu)set:
Introduction and equality rules correspond to those of the rst universe, but we also need to re ect the code set U and the decoding function T: Introduction and equality rules correspond to those for the rst universe, but we also need to re ect the rst universe U 0 and the next-universe construction Nextu u 0 : U 1 ;
It is straightforward to check that also these rules follow the general schema.
A parameterised super-universe
The construction of the super-universe U 1 can be generalised. Instead of starting with the next-universe operator, we can start with an arbitrary operator given by a pair F : (U : set)(T : (U)set)set; G : (U : set)(T : (U)set)(F (U; T))set; which maps a family of sets (U; T) into another family of sets (F (U; T); (x)G(U; T; x)). Then we can construct a super-universe (U P ; T P ) closed under this operator by a simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition. The de nition of (U P ; T P ) is analogous to the de niton of (U 1 ; T 1 ); the only di erence is that we replace Nextu by the parameter F. If we make the dependence on the parameters F and G explicit in the types of U P and T P we get U P : (F : (U : set)(T : (U)set)set) (G : (U : set)(T : (U)set)(F (U; T))set) set;
T P : (F : (U : set)(T : (U)set)set) (G : (U : set)(T : (U)set)(F (U; T))set) (c : U P (F; G)) set:
I learned about this generalization and its connection to Mahlo cardinals in set theory from Anton Setzer. For a complete account and more discussion, see Setzer 42] . (The reader should note that there are some di erences between Setzer's formalisation and the one suggested here.)
Several more examples of simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions of large universes and universe operators can be found in the recent papers by Palmgren 36 ] and Rathjen, Gri or, and Palmgren 39].
Frege structures
The notion of a Frege structure was introduced by Peter Aczel 4] . One purpose was to provide an appropriate setting for -calculus (or abstract realisability) interpretations of Martin-L of type theory. Another was to provide a model for a foundational framework where the notions of \proposition" and \truth" are primitive.
We shall here show how to construct a Frege structure in Martin-L of type theory by using a simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition. Thus we show a way to reduce this foundational framework to the foundational framework of type theory. This type-theoretic construction can be contrasted to Aczel's construction of Frege structures in classical set theory.
The notion of a Frege structure is an enrichment of the notion of a -structure. This is essentially the same as a -model in Barendregt 8] but is expressed in terms of an explicitly closed family F. Here F 0 is the set of objects of the Frege structure and F n is a set of n-ary functions on F 0 , which is used for interpreting expressions with at most n free variables. A Frege structure comes with projection functions i n : F n and F-functionals n : F n+1 ! F n and App n : F n F n ! F n satisfying appropriate equations.
The objects of a Frege structure are used both for encoding propositions and other mathematical objects. Given a -structure we can encode the logical constants: a binary connective can be encoded as a binary function on F 0 , and a quanti er can be encoded as a function from F 1 to F 0 .
A Frege structure is a -structure with encodings of logical constants together with a set of objects called propositions and a subset of these called truths. These collections have to satisfy logical schemata, such as 4, page 37]: Implication: If a is a proposition and the object b is a proposition provided that a true, then a b is a proposition, such that a b is true i a is true implies b is true.
Universal quanti cation: If f is a propositional function in F 1 , then 8xf(x) is a proposition, such that 8xf(x) is true i f(a) is true for all objects a.
Note that a b is a non-standard notion of implication, since b is required to be a proposition only when a is true.
A -structure with an encoding of the logical constants can be obtained by a standard construction in the -calculus 4]. To get a Frege structure we need to construct the collections of propositions and truths. The basic idea is to view the logical schemata as inductively de ning these collections. But a direct interpretation as a positive inductive de nition is not possible, since the notion of truth appears negatively in the logical schema for implication. Instead, Aczel 4] showed that one can interpret the logical schemata as an operator on pairs of sets of objects, which is monotone with respect to the following \conservative extension" ordering: Intuitively, when constructing new propositions, the notion of truth on old propositions should remain the same. Since this ordering is complete it follows by a standard argument that the operator has a least xed point when working in classical set theory. However, Aczel also made the following remark 4, page 55] which has provided motivation for the present work:
Nevertheless I believe this result to be constructively valid. A rigorous elaboration of this point would require an explicit discussion of the role of inductive de nitions in constructive mathematics. It will have to su ce here if I simply assert that the logical schemata form the clauses of an inductive de nition that generate the propositions and simultaneously give conditions for their truth.
The standard construction of a -structure with set of objects F 0 and an explicit equivalence relation on objects 0 , together with an encoding of the logical constants can be carried out in type theory (see for example Hedberg 24] for a formal development of constructive domain theory inside type theory).
It remains to turn the logical schemata into a simultaneous inductive de nition of the property P : (a : F 0 )set of propositionality and a recursive de nition of the truth of a proposition T : (a : F 0 )(c : P(a))set. Note that these formation rules are obtained by instantiating the schema with P = P; f = T , the singleton sequence F 0 , and a] = set. It is essential that T has a second argument, the proof that an object is a proposition, since it is de ned by recursion on that proof.
We also show the introduction rules corresponding to the logical schemata for implication and universal quanti cation. We rst extract from the -structure a function ev : ( ) ; p(x)): Note that these de nitions ensure that 0 is preserved by P and T . This can be shown formally by using the analogue of universe elimination.
The main point is that the logical schemata directly can be interpreted as a basic kind of de nition, speci cally, as a simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition which is an instance of our schema. We also note the similarity between this understanding and the intuitive reading of Aczel's construction as a conservative extension ordering: since T is a function, the truth of a proposition cannot change once it is de ned.
We therefore argue that we have shown a way to make Aczel's claim, that his result is constructively valid, precise. Essential is our use of explicit proof-objects and the fundamental di erence between an inductive and a recursive de nition in type theory.
Realisability model
To prove the consistency we shall construct a realisability model. We rst show how to interpret an arbitrary instance of the schema in 3.1-3.4. This interpretation also applies to de nitions with parameters as speci ed in 3.5 provided these parameters satis es a particular positivity criterion, see section 6.4.4.
We follow Aczel 2, 4] and interpret types as collections of objects of a Frege structure. But instead of rst building collections of propositions and truths as in Aczel's work, we shall directly construct the collections of sets Set and elements El A] (for each A 2 Set) in a manner similar to Allen 5] . These collections will be inductively de ned using Aczel's rule sets 1].
Like Aczel, we use`object' to refer to an element of a -structure and`collection' to refer to a subset of the elements of a -structure. Furthermore, since substitution in the -calculus is interpreted as set-theoretic application in the -structure, we will use the notation f x] for set-theoretic application in general.
We begin by reviewing Aczel's rule sets in 6.1. Then we review the interpretation of the logical framework in 6.2. The interpretation of sets is overviewed in 6.3. In 6.4 we then give the interpretation of the general schema for inductive-recursive de nitions. Finally, we give an example theory in 6.5 and show how to instantiate the schematic interpretation in 6.4 to give an interpretation of this example theory. It is probably better to study the example interpretation in 6.5 before reading the interpretation of the general schema in 6.4.
Rule sets
We use Aczel's 1] set-theoretic notion of rule set for de ning these collections. It is de ned as follows. We use rule sets rather than monotone operators here, since they allow a more direct encoding of type-theoretic inductive de nitions expressed in terms of introduction rules.
Interpretation of the logical framework
We rst brie y review the interpretation of the logical framework in a -structure satisfying the -and the -rule.
The open terms of the logical framework are interpreted as follows. Abstraction and application are interpreted in terms of the F-functionals n and App n in the -structure. Variables are interpreted as projections i n . For reasons of presentation we shall in the sequel use the same notation for a term and its interpretation in the -structure: (x)b for ( F 0 is the set of objects of the -structure (as in the section on Frege structures) and a is the result of applying the denotation a 2 F n to the sequence of n objects given by . If the judgement in question is made under the assumptions (in the context) x 1 : 1 ; : : : ; x n : n then assigns objects to variables as follows:
x 1 = a 1 One can verify that all rules of the logical framework hold under this interpretation.
Overview of the interpretation of inductive and recursive de nitions
We shall now show how to interpret sets and functions introduced by (possibly simultaneous) inductive and recursive de nitions. We call a speci c sequence of de nitions a theory. Recall from section 3 that the correctness of a given simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition is always given relative to the sequence of prior de nitions. Also recall the following:
An inductive de nition is given by a sequence of typings of constants for a set constructor and its element constructors. A recursive de nition is given by a typing of a function constant together with its recursion equations.
A simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition is given by a sequence of typings of constants for a set constructor, a function constant, and the element constructors together with the recursion equations for the function constant. The interpretation of an arbitrary theory following the schema has two parts. These two parts correspond to the following parts in Aczel 4 ].
1. The formation of an independent family of F-functionals for the logical constants, and the use of xed points to interpret recursion equations. 2. The construction of the collections of propositions and truths. 6 
.1 Interpretation of constants
We assume that no de nition has parameters. The interpretation of these are discussed in 6.4.4. First we form the list of set constructors with associated arities, and for each inductively de ned set we form its list of element constructors with associated arities. For each of these lists we interpret the constructors as objects of the -structure in such a way that there is another object case satisfying the recursion equations for case analysis. We call this interpretation an independent family of objects for a list of constructors.
Independent families of objects can always be found, but the de nability of case forces us to use \recursive" rather than \iterative" encodings, see the discussion by Parigot 37] and Altenkirch 6] .
Secondly, for each recursively de ned function constant, we construct an element satisfying the recursion equations in question. This can be done in a standard way using xed points and case analysis. This construction is also used by Aczel 4 ]. But this follows directly by using the recursion equations for f.
Interpretation of base types
Finally, the interpretation of the constants in 6.4.1 was speci cally constructed to ensure that the equality rules for f are satis ed.
The interpretation of parameters
So far we have discussed the interpretation of set formers without parameters. Recall from subsection 3.5 that a set former can be parameterised with respect to an arbitrary sequence of types. It is easy to extend the interpretation to account for parameters as long as these parameters contain no occurrences of set in the -part of a (x : ) . Because then we see that El can be given by a monotone inductive de nition using rule sets.
For an example of the interpretation of a set former with parameters, the reader is referred to the interpretation of in subsection 6.5.
When the preliminary version of this paper was written I was not aware of any interesting examples with such negative occurrences. But recently I learned that there indeed are several examples of such de nitions of sets which are interesting as type-theoretic analogues of large cardinals. An example is the parameterised super-universe in 4.3.
It is therefore an interesting open problem to construct a classical set-theoretic model of the entire schema for simultaneous induction-recursion. The belief that the entire schema is consistent relies at present on an informal semantic analysis of the rules which shows that only well-founded elements and terminating functions can be constructed under the schema.
Consistency
The interpretation of ? is the empty set. Hence we have shown that any theory obtainable by successive instantiations of the schema (satisfying the restriction on parameters) is consistent relative to classical set theory.
One can also argue from an informal semantical analysis that there can be no element a : ?. Because when a is evaluated it would terminate with a value of the form intro(a 1 ; : : : ; a n ) where intro is a constructor for ?. But ? has no constructor. This is called \simple-minded consistency" in Martin-L of 29].
Interpretation of an example theory
We now show how to interpret an example theory. This theory is chosen to illustrate di erent aspects of the general situation and consists of the following parts: (i) the inductive de nition of the set N of natural numbers; (ii) the recursive de nition of the addition function add; (iii) the inductive de nition of the family N 0 (n) of nite sets indexed by the number n of elements of the set; (iv) the inductive de nition of the cartesian product (A; B) of a family of sets; and (v) the simultaneous inductive-recursive de nition of a universe re ecting N, N 0 , and . The reader should check that the interpretation given here is indeed obtainable from the schematic interpretation given in 6.4.
The example theory
We list the rules of the theory. Note that we write El(A) rather than just A (as before) for the type of elements of the set A. This is because the interpretation of El is the crucial part of the realisability Cartesian product of a family of sets. Addition. The typing rule for add is interpreted as m 2 N n 2 N add(m; n) 2 N: This can be shown by induction on n 2 N using the recursion equations for add.
The equality rules for add follow directly from the recursion equations. Moreover, we can check that the typings in the equality rules are satis ed.
The family of nite sets. The equality rules for T 0 follow directly, since T 0 2 F 0 was constructed to satisfy the corresponding untyped equalities. Moreover, we easily check that the typings in the equality rules are satis ed.
Concluding remarks
The formulation of simultaneous inductive-recursive de nitions is obtained by a minor syntactic modication of the schema in Dybjer 20] . This adds evidence to the fundamental nature of the schematic natural deduction formulation of inductive de nitions in type theory.
The idea to consider this generalisation was inspired by Nax Mendler's paper 32] on the categorytheoretic semantics of universes in type theory. Our analysis improves fundamentally on Mendler's, since the category-theoretic machinery can be applied only if the rules for U 0 and T 0 already have been represented as an endofunctor on a category of families of sets. This representation is not itself analysed and also loses the U 0 -recursive nature of T 0 . It is not clear how to use category-theoretic ideas for obtaining a formal system for simultaneous induction-recursion.
The idea to enrich Frege structures with proof objects can also be found in Sato 40] . However, Sato works in a type-free constructive theory and not in type theory. Working in the same framework as Sato, Kameyama 25] has developed an approach to half-positive inductive de nitions. His aims are similar to ours: to formulate a general notion which subsumes the construction of Frege structures and enables the interpretation of Martin-L of type theory. In his type-free context the distinction between inductively and recursively de ned sets (that our approach is based on) does not exist. Instead he considers simultaneous inductive de nitions which give rise to operators which are monotone in the sense of an ordering which generalises Aczel's ordering for Frege structures described above.
As further examples of simultaneous induction-recursion, we would like to mention in particular the computability predicates used by Martin-L of 31, 27] and C. Coquand 12] for proving normalisation of type theory, and the logical relations introduced by T. Coquand 13] for proving soundness and completeness of an algorithm for testing conversion in type theory. These constructions are similar in nature to the collections of propositions and truths in a Frege structure, and can be given a classical explanation in an analogous way. By de ning constructions of these kinds by simultaneous inductionrecursion we have paved the way for \internal type theory " 21] , that is, to locally re ect the metatheory of type theory in itself. In particular, we hope to extend the technique of reduction-free normalization 15, 11, 17] developed for the simply typed case to dependent types.
